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Thus, in the line of cases which has followed Goldberg, two 1971
decisions have been helpful in shedding some light on the inherent
problems of applying a balancing test. In Bell the Supreme Court has
indicated that where the government has issued a benefit to an individual, whatever that benefit may be, it will take more than administrative and fiscal considerations to suspend or terminate that benefit
without a prior hearing. In Chenango Court the Second Circuit illustrated that the addition of some other private interest to the state's
fiscal and administrative side of the balance can be sufficient to offset
the individual's interest in maintaining his state assistance and in such
case no pre-termination hearing will be required.

B.

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS ACCOMPANYING THE RIGHT TO A

HEARING:

A

PUBLIC "TRIAL"

Most of the cases following Goldberg v. Kelly' have dealt only
with the constitutional right to a hearing and not with the procedural
safeguards which might accompany that hearing, such as a right to
oral argument, presentation of witnesses, or cross-examination of
witnesses. Fitzgerald v. Hampton2 illustrates an increasing effort to
extend Goldberg to require such procedural safeguards. 3 In Fitzgerald the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a
dismissed federal employee had a constitutional right to a public dismissal hearing. While holding the position of Deputy for Management Systems of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the
employee had revealed, in highly publicized testimony before the
Joint Economic Committee, a high cost overrun on the Air Force
contract for the C5A transport aircraft.4 The employee, a preference
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See pp. 158-59 supra.
2. _
F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1971).
3. See, e.g., Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 940-43
(1971). For a listing of pending cases involving this issue, see Richardson v. Wright, U.S.
, ____n.l, reprinted at, 40 U.S.L.W. 4232, 4233 n.l (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972) (Nos. 70-161 &
70-5211).
4. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2589-96 (1968).
5. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1971). The
statutory definition of "preference eligible" is found in 5 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(3) (1970). These
employees are granted a somewhat favored status. Even in reduction-in-force situations, the
Civil Service Commission is directed to "give due effect to" an employee's preference eligible
status. Id. § 3502(a)(2).
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eligible, 5 was ultimately dismissed from his position through what the
Air Force claimed was a routine reduction-in-force separation. Fitzgerald appealed his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission on the
grounds that he had been wrongfully discharged in retaliation for his
testimony. Civil Service regulations do not require a hearing for a
reduction-in-force dismissal6 but the practice of the Commission on
appeal is to grant a discretionary hearing to preference eligibles. 7 The
Commission, therefore, granted Fitzgerald's request for a hearing but
refused to open the hearing to the public, relying on Civil Service
regulations specifying that all proceedings involving appeals to the
Commission of actions against employees should be closed.' Fitzgerald then filed a petition in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to enjoin the administrative proceedings, contending that his separation was actually a dismissal for cause and that
the due process clause of the fifth amendment not only gave him the
right to a hearing for such dismissal, but also the right to have that
hearing held open to the public. The Government contended that the
dismissal was not for cause and that, therefore, there was no right to
a hearing of any type; that the hearing held was a discretionary one;
and that the Constitution did not dictate any procedures for discretionary hearings. The district court granted Fitzgerald's motion for
summary judgment and permanently enjoined the Government from
holding closed hearings. 9
Although the constitutional right to have judicial proceedings held
open to the public has long been a cornerstone of the American
judicial system," the availability of this right as a concomitant of an
administrative hearing is not so apparent. Among the few courts
which have dealt with the issue are two recent district court cases.
6. See5 C.F.R. pt. 351 (1971).
7. Brief for Appellant at 9, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, .

F.2d

-

(D.C. Cir. 1971).

8. 5 C.F.R. § 772.305(c)(3) (1971).
9.

-

F. Supp. at

-

After notice of appeal was filed by the Government in the Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the district court granted a motion by the
employee that open hearings be promptly resumed. District Court for the District of Columbia,
Order of October 15, 1971. On the Government's request, the court of appeals granted a stay
of this district court order pending appeal, but specified that the case be scheduled for argument
on the merits as soon as possible. District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, Order of
November 8, 1971. See Brief for Appellants at 6, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, F.2d (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
10. See, e.g., I T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927); J. WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
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Both held that a student has a constitutional right to a hearing prior
to suspension but does not have a right to have that hearing held open
to the public.11 These cases are distinguishable from Fitzgerald,
however, as they were based on what each court found to be overriding considerations: in one case, maintaining order and discipline in the
proceeding,12 and in the other, protecting the reputation of the students.13 In 1937 the Supreme Court stated in dicta in Morgan v.
United States" that, as a general rule, hearings should be open to the
public. The Court noted that in administrative proceedings of a quasijudicial ct-aracter, the liberty and property of the citizen should be
protected by thb rudimentary requirements of fair play, and that these
demanded- a fair and open hearing which was essential to the legal
validity afd soundness of this important governmental process. 5
However, this case did not directly involve the issue of actual physical
access to the proceedings, but merely upheld the appellant's right to
receive'a transcript of the hearing, a right now specifically granted by
statute."6 In FCC v. Schreiber 7 the Supreme Court held that an
agency could insist upon open hearings. In that case the complainant's activities were the subject of an investigation, and he sought to
have a number of documents containing trade secrets and other confidential business information reviewed in camera by the agency. The
Court upheld the agency regulations which required disclosure of the
information in a, hearing open to the public, approved the presumption in favor of public proceedings which the regulations established,
and stated that the presumption accorded with a general policy favoring disclosure- of administrative agency proceedings. In spite of this
language, however, the case might be read as authority for upholding
the agency's attempt to restrict access in Fitzgerald, because the
Schreiber Court' stated that it could alter the agency's procedural
rules only if they were arbitrary or capricious. The "arbitrary or
11. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Zanders v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968). In the latter case the court

went so far as'to say that "no citation of authority has been submitted and, indeed, there is
none, which, necessitates a public hearing in such matters." Id. at 768.
12. 284 F. Supp. at 731.
13. 281 F. supp. at 768.
14. 304 U.S. 1 (1938).

15. Id. at 1415.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1970).
17. 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
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capricious" test, however, should not be applied in cases such as
Fitzgeraldwhere a constitutional right is involved and the-agency rule

does not itself favor full disclosure, as did the rule in Schreiber.
Procedures followed in criminal prosecutions, where a public
hearing is expressly guaranteed by the sixth amendment,", have sometimes been transferred to the administrative setting in support of the
9
principle of open hearings. It has been suggested that In re Oliver,

which held that due process requires a public proceeding for a judicial
commitment to jail for contempt of court, is applicable to cases in-

volving discharge from federal employment. 20 Thereis also nonjudicial authority indicating a preference for open hearings. The 1941

Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 2' declared that administrative hearings should be, and almost
invariably were, public, and that the few exceptions should be for the
2l

benefit of the individuals involved. The Freedom of Information Act

was adopted primarily to facilitate public awareness of the activities

of administrative agencies, and to make information about the execu-

tive branch more available to the public, 23 and the Act would seem to

also support the establishment of a presumption in favor of open
hearings.
The constitutional requirement for an open hearing was developed
in Fitzgeraldby a novel application of traditional concepts. The court
extended the considerations originally developed to determine the

need for any hearing at all24 to support its holding that a public
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

19.
20.
cases.
21.
(1941).
22.
23.

333 U.S. 257 (1948).
1 DAVIS § 8.09. The suggestion, however, was specifically intended only for loyalty
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

68

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
This is evident from a reading of the legislative history of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 1497,

at 1.See also Comment, The Freedom of Information Act: Access to Law, 36 FORDHAM L.
REV. 765, 766 (1968).
24. The right to a full trial-type hearing in administrative proceedings is generally limited

pertaining to a particular party-are in
to the situation where adjudicatory facts-that is, fac'ts
issue. Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1962); DAVIS (Supp. 1970)
§ 7.02; see p. 164 supra. In the field of discharge from public employment, the actual right of
a dismissed employee to a hearing is generally limited to the situation where the dismissal has
a significant and substantial impact on the reputation ofthe employee which might adversely
affect his ability to obtain further employment. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Birnbaum v. Trussell,
371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
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proceeding was required. The court partially relied on the principle
that where an employee's ability to earn a livelihood was affected by
a discharge, more stringent due process safeguards were to be followed.2 5 It then appeared to utilize, without identifying. the balancing
test the Supreme Court had developed in Goldberg v. Kelly.26 to
decide" that a public hearing was necessary. However, the Fitzgerald
court failed to examine all of the countervailing interests claimed by
the parties in that case. Only Fitzgerald's right to earn a livelihood
was weighed against the Government's bare contention of a justification for closed hearings to protect the privacy of the employee, and
the court said that from a balancing of these considerations it was
clear that petitioner's interests were stronger and that he should be
granted an open hearing.27 The individual interests actually invoked
by the parties in this case were less than compelling-neither the
employee2 s nor the Government20 presented a clear showing of a need
for an open or closed hearing. Therefore, the Goldberg balancing test.
even if applied to all of the interests forwarded by the parties, would
yield less than conclusive results.
An additional rationale utilized by the court was the application
to the administrative context of public trial concepts developed in the
judicial setting. Citing In re Oliver" and Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC,"
25. See note 24 supra.
26. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See p. 158-59 supra.
27. The privacy of the employee, the court felt, obviously had no validity where it was the
employee himself who was demanding the open hearing. _F. Supp. at
28. Fitzgerald claimed that public scrutiny was required to clear his reputation upon which
his livelihood depended, and to vindicate the right of the press and public to learn about
governmental waste and inefficiency. Brief for Appellees at 15-16, Fitzgerald v. Hampton,
.
F.2d(D.C. Cir. 1971). In answer to these contentions it should be emphasized that
the hearings to be conducted in this case were not to be secret; they were to be adjudicatory
proceedings with Fitzgerald represented by counsel, and the transcript was to be available to
the petitioner with no restrictions on publicizing its contents. The only limitation was that the
press and public were not to be admitted.
29. Civil Service Commission Chairman Hampton, subsequent to the district court's decision, attempted to list additional considerations militating in favor of limiting access to the
hearings. Letter from Chairman Hampton to Senator Proxmire, June 1, 1971, in Brief for
Appellant at 15-17, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971). These included
the desirability of maintaining uncomplicated proceedings to facilitate and expedite the search
for truth by creating a calm atmosphere; a lack of contempt power by the hearing examiners
with which to maintain order; and a lack of ability and expertise on the part of the examiners
to regulate the decorum of the hearings. As the court noted, it is difficult to see how the
admittance of the public would hinder the search for truth, and there is no evidence of any threat
of disruption.
30. 333 U.S. 257 (1948). See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
31. 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See note 24 supra.
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the court noted that a public hearing was a necessary ingredient of a
fair trial, and that, although Fitzgerald's hearing was not prosecutorial in nature, it directly affected the rights of an individual, it was
an adversary proceeding, and the final outcome would be a decision
on the merits. Although the court failed to make an explicit holding
that Fitzgerald's dismissal was actually for cause, its statements that
the dismissal would affect his future ability to gain employment and
that the employee's "right to a livelihood was at stake" 32 imply that
it was adopting that factual determination and was rejecting the Government's contention that this was no more than a reduction-in-force
separation. 3 Once this decision was reached, it is probable, although
not altogether clear, that under existing case law a constitutional
requirement for a hearing prior to separation would exist. 4 Unfortunately, the court again failed to make its holding explicit; and it is not
clear whether it was holding that the hearing itself was constitutionally necessary and that the right to have it open accompanied the
constitutional requirement, or whether it was holding merely that
once a discretionary hearing was granted by the agency, it was constitutionally necessary to hold it open to the public and the press. It
would seem that in the absence of any initial statutory 3 or constitutional right to a hearing, the policy arguments favoring open proceedings, however persuasive, would be insufficient to dictate a
constitutionalrequirement that discretionary hearings be held open to
the public. If the court intended to rely on a constitutional right to a
hearing because of the adverse effect of the dismissal on the employee's reputation, then the requirement for an open hearing is more
persuasive. The Supreme Court has analogized proceedings that affect a dismissed employee in this manner to proceedings "involving
32.
- F. Supp. at 33. The ability of the court to make this finding is somewhat suspect in light of the settled
principle that fact determinations, so long as they are "reasonably" made, are within the
exclusive province of the administrative agency. 4 DAVIS §§ 30.02-.03. However, precisely what
procedural safeguards are required in administrative hearings has traditionally been left to
judicial determination. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 30.10.
34. See note 24 supra.
35. Although the Administrative Procedure Act does not specifically provide a statutory
right to a hearing for either reduction-in-force or a dismissal for cause, internal executive
regulations require an evidentiary hearing both at the employing agency level and upon appeal
to the Civil Service Commission. Exec. Order No. 10,987, 27 Fed. Reg. 550 (1962). See also
Williams v. Brown, 384 F.2d 981, 984-95 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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the imposition of criminal sanctions,"3 and has held that due process
requires the use of at least some of the same protections that the
citizen would have in a criminal trial.3 However, the extension of this
line of authority might prove too inflexible. There will be circumstances where the agency is justified in holding closed hearings. Perhaps
the optimum resolution of the problem would be to couple a presumption in favor of open hearings with the extension of the Goldberg
balancing test utilized by the Fitzgerald court. The presumption
would recognize the policy arguments favoring open hearings by shiftingtheburden to the Government to show a legitimate governmental
interest for restricting access, and the balancing test would permit the
court to weigh, on a case by case basis, the competing interests.35

C.

USE OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND THE "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE"
STANDARD

Richardson v. Perales' and its attendant trilogy of lower court
opinions 2 reflect the constant friction in administrative law generated
by a mounting case load and a conscious effort to insure justice in
each individual proceeding. The final decision established that uncorroborated hearsay can constitute "substantial evidence" sufficient to

support an administrative ruling.
36. Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting), vacated and
remanded,372 U.S. 765 (1963).
37. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1958) (granting right to hearing where accusers
could be confronted and cross-examined); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (granting right
to appeal from unfavorable agency ruling).
38. It is entirely possible that the court of appeals will not reach the issue of an open hearing
on the appeal of the Fitzgerald decision. The doctrine that a litigant must exhaust his administrative remedies before judicial appeal, enunciated in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 (1937), applies to employment-discharge cases. E.g., American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971); Hills v. Eisenhart, 256 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.
1958); Green v. Baughman, 214 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The district court held that
Fitzgerald represented one of the exceptions to the exhaustion principle-that established avenues for review may be bypassed "where an adequate remedy for the issue in question would not
exist after the agency action. See Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970). The court
felt that the "probability of unfairness" presented by non-public proceedings would not lend
itself to later judicial review. F. Supp. at The court of appeals may reverse on the
exhaustion issue and remand this case to the Civil Service Commission for completion of
hearings.
1. 402 U.S. 389 (1971), noted in The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 326
(1971).
2. Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), rehearingdenied, 416 F.2d 1250 (1969), noted
in 1970 Duke Project 153; Perales v. Secretary, 288 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Tex. 1968).

